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Abstract Preparatory talks to the next round of negotiations seem to indicate that a
comprehensive agreement to mitigate climate change will not be easily attainable, de-
spite the intentions of the US administration and the high expectations surrounding
the Copenhagen meeting. One key reason is to what extent fast growing economies,
and especially China, should take actions to reduce their growth of emissions. This
paper argues that a turning point for international negotiations on climate change
could be achieved if China were to agree on carbon obligations in the future. Results
from modelling work suggest that the optimal investment behaviour is to anticipate
the implementation of a climate policy by roughly 10 years, and that thus future
commitments—if credible—could lead to significantly earlier steps towards carbon
mitigation. If fast growing economies, and foremost China, believe in the long term
objective of global stabilization of carbon concentrations, it might be economically
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rationale to sign on future targets, provided developed countries take on immediate
action. Such a provision could be beneficial for both the developing and developed
world.
1 Introduction
During their most recent meeting in Italy, G8 countries have reiterated the commit-
ment for taking rapid and effective global action to combat climate change.1 The
representatives of the largest developed economies have recognized the need that
the increase in global average temperature above preindustrial levels should not
exceed 2◦C, and have supported a target of emissions reductions by developed
countries of 80% by 2050 compared to recent years, and proposed a global objective
of 50% by 2050. Given that the current CO2 emissions from OECD and non-
OECD countries are roughly equivalent, such a statement automatically implies that
developing countries should aim at reducing their emissions by 20% with respect to
current levels by the same time frame.2
This objective is however largely in contrast with the negotiating positions of
essentially all emerging economies and least developed countries, which appeal to
the large gaps in per capita emissions that divides the developed and developing
countries, as well as to their different historical responsibilities. Such a diversity
of positions suggests that the long standing logjam that has so far prevented the
attainment of a wide ranging agreement in climate mitigation is still there, and
that it might be hardly overcome by the strive for a post-2012 global agreement
in Copenhagen. Yet, it is now accepted that a second best agreement with partial
and delayed participation of developing countries would jeopardize its economic and
environmental effectiveness (Bosetti et al. 2008; Edmonds et al. 2007; Keppo and
Rao 2007; Clarke et al. 2009).
The changed attitude of the US administration has removed a long-standing
obstacle, increasing the likelihood of concerted climate mitigation action from the
major developed countries. Nonetheless, managing fast growing economies, China
on top of the list, to get involved in the ultimate objective of climate stabilization
will be the essential achievement of this and following rounds of negotiations.
For example, despite the lower national averages, an increasingly large number of
Chinese citizens are aiming at lifestyles and thus emissions similar to the ones of
mature economies. According to Chakravarty et al. (2009), in 2030 China may have
roughly 100 and 300 million people with per capita emissions equal or above today’s
US (20 t CO2) and EU (10 t CO2) averages, respectively.
Such a dynamic process will require a progressive involvement of all major con-
tributors to climate change. Countries in economic transition should act strategically
since they are the ones where most of the investments are or will be made; thus, they
should equip themselves with a stock of capital that can withstand the possibility of
carbon regulation and meet the standard of the newly created markets for low carbon
technologies. They should take on the opportunity to become innovators and move
1http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/MEF_Declarationl.pdf
2We thank Rob Socolow for first noticing this.
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to a more knowledge based economy. And they should be able to hedge against
increasingly scarce resources such as fossil fuels, land and water.
In order to engage fast growing economies such as Brazil, Russia, India and China
(the BRICs), many policies can be envisioned, such as international offsets, trade
policies, technology and adaptation funds. This paper puts forward an additional
suggestion. We argue that by committing now to future carbon obligations, fast
growing countries would anticipate the adoption of energy and carbon efficiency
measures and thus embark on an earlier mitigation pathway that could have positive
repercussions for both the developed and developing world. This suggestion stems
from the modelling results of Bosetti et al. (2008, 2009) in which policy anticipation
is shown to have the potential to dominate leakage; investments in low carbon tech-
nologies and innovation are anticipated by roughly 10 years before the actual policy is
implemented, to avoid the long lived energy capital stock to become inefficient when
carbon is priced. Given its prominence in global emissions, its investment capacity
and long term planning, China’s commitment to future reductions could pave the
way for a comprehensive climate deal.
This paper presents some results using WITCH, an energy–economy–climate
model designed to evaluate climate change and energy policies. WITCH is an inter-
temporal optimization, regional model that has been widely used for the economic
analysis of international climate policies. Its main distinguishing features include
an in built representation of the energy sector into a macro-economic depiction of
the economy, the modelling of technological evolution via diffusion and innovation
processes related to both energy and carbon efficiency improvements, and a game
theoretical set up that captures the strategic interaction of the various regions. This
modelling framework allows us to account for various global externalities such as
CO2, innovation market failures and overexploitation of finite natural resources.3
As an example, we examine the case of a long term stabilization goal of 550 ppm
CO2 equivalent. OECD countries are assumed to take on immediate (2015) com-
mitment, whereas developing countries participation is graduated over time, with
BRIC countries joining in 2030 and the rest of world in 2050.4 We compare two
scenarios: a myopic one in which late participants stick to their BAU investments
before joining the climate coalition, and a foresight one in which policy anticipation
is allowed. In doing so, we are able to evaluate the implications of future obligations
in terms of the transitional investments in energy and carbon efficiency. Many are the
incentives to deviate from a baseline case, in both directions. A partial carbon policy
could lead to international leakage through lower fossil fuel prices, delocalization of
energy intensive industries and change in trade due to altered competitiveness. On
the other hand, it could lead to lower emissions by creating new markets for low
carbon technologies, by international technological and knowledge spillovers and
by anticipation of future carbon prices in long lived investments. Through analysis
carried out with an integrated assessment model, we suggest that the latter would
dominate. Corroboration for this result can be found in the companion article by
Blanford et al. (2009a).
3Full details about the model and related applications are accessible at the website www.feem-
web.it/WITCH
4Although Russia already has an obligation under the Kyoto protocol, its association with the other
major emerging economies reflects the uncertainty over its current and future climate policies.
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Fig. 1 Investments in China in nuclear power (left) and energy R&D (right) before joining the
climate coalition in 2030
2 Optimal investment strategies when China takes on future obligations
We investigate the implications of the agreement to start mitigation in 2030 on the
transitional investments in low carbon options and innovation in China.5 Figure 1
shows that investments in nuclear power generation and public energy R&D are
anticipated as early as 2015, when the future target can be foreseen. In 2020, China
invests three times as much in nuclear power plants as in the baseline and by
2030 it achieves roughly 70 GW of nuclear power capacity, as opposed to 30 GW
in the myopic case. The surge in public energy R&D investments, given the long
commercialization lag times and the smaller investment amounts, starts even earlier,
heading off baseline 15 years before. Investments in coal power plants without
sequestration could proceed but should be eliminated after 2020, by which year the
transport sector should also begin to decarbonize. Electricity generation with carbon
capture and storage (CCS) would be required later in time (2030), only at the time
when China mitigation obligations really come into force.
The investment requirements envisaged by the commitment to commit are not
incompatible with the objectives China has set for itself. For example, China has set a
2020 nuclear power target of 40 GW, and officials are now claiming that this objective
may be exceeded by 50%, reaching 60 GW by 2020.6 It is also aiming at becoming
a global technological and scientific powerhouse, with a total R&D spending target
5China is a separate region in the model and we can thus present specific results for this BRIC
country.
6http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssConsumerGoodsAndRetailNews/idUSL0868760220080308
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Fig. 2 Energy related carbon
emissions in China to 2030
of 2.5% of GDP by 2020. Most recently, China has allocated considerably resources
(221 billion USD) to the green recovery of the financial crisis, twice as much as the
US did (Robins et al. 2009).
The investment patterns indicate that policy anticipation could prompt early
action in a major emerging economy such as China. Such a deviation from baseline
would materialize in earlier mitigation of CO2 emissions, by roughly 10 years as
shown in Fig. 2.7 Emissions would level off after 2020. A similar result can be found
in Blanford et al. (2009b).
3 The economic benefits of early action
The mitigation effort of BRIC countries due to policy anticipation would give the
OECD countries some additional abatement headroom, with understandable bene-
fits in terms of reduced policy costs. Interestingly, we find that emerging economies
could also benefit from an anticipation strategy.
Table 1 shows that the efficiency gains of policy anticipation—calculated as the
relative difference in policy costs between the foresight and myopic cases—can be
positive both globally and regionally. The global costs of stabilizing concentrations
at 550 ppm CO2 equivalent would be reduced by 40% with respect to a case in
which latecomers followed a myopic baseline strategy. The OECD countries have
the most to gain by such a deal, that would allow them to halve their policy costs,
which would otherwise be high had they to take on full mitigation responsibility to
2030. Nonetheless, both the BRIC and the rest of the developing countries would see
their climate bill reduced by roughly 1/4, a non negligible saving.
This is because capital build up that is optimized for the future policies would
be better suited to bear carbon pricing and would trigger additional technological
change. Given the many inertias that characterize the way energy is produced and
consumed, this could lead to lower macroeconomic impacts of capital replacement
and reallocation, and to lower global carbon prices due to higher innovation and
better experience.
7Obviously, increasing the inertia with which energy capital can be replaced beyond the values
assumed in the model would further stretch the anticipation period.
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Table 1 Reduction of global and regional macro-economic costs of climate policy due to policy
anticipation (costs calculated as net present value losses of Gross World Product at a 5% discount
rate)





It should be noted, however, that carbon price harmonization could eventually
impose higher absolute costs to carbon intensive economies in developed and mostly
developing countries. Participation incentives might be provided to alleviate part
of this burden, for example through an international carbon market. Recognizing
emission reductions below fast growing economies’ optimal policy foresight strategy
(and not their baseline) could encourage their accession without implying excessively
large financial transfers from developed countries.
4 Policy ahead
Achieving a comprehensive international climate treaty will be a hard task given the
many incentives to free ride on this global issue. The next rounds of UNFCCC meet-
ings might not determine the solution but can prepare the ground for a negotiation
process that might be revised periodically for many years. Several policy instruments
should be used to gradually engage the most important countries into the global
effort of mitigating climate change, keeping in mind the need for an economically
sound solution.
This article has quantified the implications of fast growing economies commitment
to future emission reduction obligations and has suggested that it could lead to
significant benefits in terms of carbon abatement, technological innovation and
economic efficiency. The investment requirements to comply with such a deal are
likely manageable by China, a country that holds 2 USD Trillions of foreign exchange
reserves. Indeed, several proposed national policies are compatible with such a future
obligation. Ideally, the involvement of China could foster an escalate out of the
current negotiation stall.
Such a strategy could be rational for the fastest growing economies as well, that
would build up a less carbon intensive capital stock and could master technological
change. It could also be complemented by some international offsets provision to
create additional accession incentives.
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